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reducible to nor explicable in terms of representational 
states or content.1 In particular, advocates of non-represen-
tational views of perception maintain that the phenomenal 
character of veridical perception—broadly, “what it is like” 
(Nagel 1974) for the subject to undergo the relevant experi-
ence—is explained by the obtaining of a non-representa-
tional psychological relation to external mind-independent 
objects. This places the resulting views in opposition not 
only to representational or intentional theories, but also to 
adverbialism (Ducasse 1942; Chisholm 1957; Tye 1984), 
sense-datum theory (Broad 1952; Moore 1953), and non-
representational qualia or ‘mental paint’ (Block 1996, 
2010) views of perception.
In contrast to this  representationalist orthodoxy, rela-
tional views characterise perceptual experience in terms of 
a primitive non-representational relation to exter-
nal objects, facts or events. While both Naïve Realist2 and 
sense-datum theories claim that perception involves an irre-
ducible relation to, or “acquaintance” (Russell 1912) with, 
objects, the theories differ with respect to the kinds of 
objects with which we are perceptually acquainted. Accord-
ing to Naïve Realism, these are the  everyday external 
objects or events and their properties that we seem to per-
ceive, where this may include perceptual ephemera such as 
rainbows, sounds or clouds. According to sense-datum 
1 For brevity, we will use ‘experience’ to mean all conscious percep-
tual episodes, where this includes both (i)  veridical perception and 
(ii) non-veridical perceptual illusions and hallucinations.
2 We use the capitalised term to refer to the philosophical theory, and 
to differentiate it from ‘direct realism’ (see Sects. 2 and 4).
1  The Terms of the Debate
The idea that perceptual experiences have representational 
content has become something of an orthodoxy in recent 
philosophy of perception. It forms part of a view that 
aspires to extend some of Frege’s (1956) insights on 
thought to other mental occurrences such as beliefs, judge-
ments, recollections and imaginings to provide a general 
and integrated account of the mind. The notion of represen-
tation also plays a central, some say ineliminable (Burge 
2005, 2010), role in perceptual science, and for those who 
endorse computational theories of mind (e.g. Fodor 1975; 
Marr 1982). Nevertheless, some philosophers, including 
many of the contributors to this special issue, have sought 
to deny that perception is fundamentally representational. 
Such denials need not be taken to oppose current percep-
tual science. Rather, the claim—or at least one version of 
it—is that conscious perceptual experience is neither 
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theory, on the other hand, perception doesn’t relate us 
directly to these external objects, but to sense-data.3 Sense-
datum theories, however, face distinctive problems of their 
own and have since largely fallen out of favour.4 We will 
therefore reserve the terms ‘relationalism’ and ‘relational 
views’ for the latter family of views which includes Naïve 
Realism (Martin 1997, 2004, 2006), Campbell’s ‘Rela-
tional View’ (2002), and Brewer’s ‘Object View’ (2011, 
this issue).
This special issue focuses upon the debate between rep-
resentational views and these emerging relational views of 
perception. In particular, we aim to shed light upon the 
commitments and motivations of the latter which, being 
historically more recent and less widely held, have all too 
often been poorly understood by their detractors, many of 
whom have taken such views to be wildly implausible, 
incompatible with current scientific theory, or simply 
inscrutable. Indeed, for those steeped in the representa-
tional tradition, it can be difficult to understand why one 
might want to deny what may seem an obvious truth about 
perceptual experiences: that they represent how things in 
the world are. Furthermore, it is unclear that representa-
tional and relational views should be considered mutually 
exclusive, since relationalism need not be formulated in 
terms of the denial of representational content, and nor do 
these options exhaust the field.5 Indeed, some variants of 
the views have much in common (Sect. 2, 3).
We aim to elucidate relational views of perception in 
a way that facilitates a more nuanced debate (see Brewer, 
Travis, Martin). Other contributions explore the phenom-
enal character of experience and its explanatory role (Bro-
gaard, Dokic and Martin, Eilan), and reappraise existing 
arguments both for (Brogaard) and against (O’Sullivan, 
Judge, Ivanov) relational views. We hope that this goes 
some way towards demonstrating that, far from being an 
implausible fringe view, relational theories constitute a 
significant and genuine attempt to overcome some central 
3 Among early proponents of sense-data the nature of these entities 
was an open question. Moore (1926), for example, takes sense-data 
to be parts of the surfaces of objects. After lengthy discussion, Price 
(1932) concludes that sense-data are not physical, but mind-inde-
pendent, while Russell (1921) argues that they are neither physical 
nor mental. In recent discussions the assumption that sense-data are 
non-physical or mind-dependent entities that resemble or stand in 
some external (e.g. causal) relation to ordinary physical objects has 
prevailed (see Robinson 1994; Foster 2000; Huemer 2011).
4 The locus classicus for such objections is Barnes (1944). Contem-
porary defenders of sense-datum theories include Jackson (1977), 
Robinson (1994), and Foster (2000).
5 For example, many philosophers claim that there are irreduc-
ible qualitative properties, or qualia, that either totally (e.g. Block 
2003, 2010) or in part (e.g. Peacocke 1983; Block 1996; Shoemaker 
1990) determine the phenomenal character of experience, though we 
do not engage directly with these views here.
problems in the philosophy of perception, and, as such, 
are worthy of further consideration—not least by their 
opponents.
2  Representational Views
The orthodox view of perception, which we will call rep-
resentationalism, is that perception relates us to the world 
by representing it to be some particular way—for exam-
ple, that some object instantiates specific properties. This 
makes experiences analogous to thoughts in that they have 
contents that are objectively, or possibly intersubjectively, 
evaluable for truth or accuracy. Such views have the benefit 
of unifying a diverse range of experiences, including hal-
lucinations and illusions, with non-perceptual states such 
as thoughts, beliefs, desires, imaginings, recollections and 
intentional actions.
Representational theories of perception are often known 
as ‘intentional’ theories, not to be confused with intention-
alism, which makes a stronger claim concerning phenome-
nal character (see below). The term ‘intentionality’ has its 
origins in scholasticism and was revived by Brentano 
(1874) and the phenomenological tradition.6 In its contem-
porary usage, intentionality is often held to be the distinc-
tive mark of mental states and occurrences, indicating that 
they are directed towards, or about, worldly objects or 
states of affairs. In relation to perception, however, the label 
is potentially confusing since most if not all theories of per-
ception take perceptual states to be directed towards or 
about the world in some sense. Representationalists, how-
ever, hold that perception is about the world in virtue of its 
representing a particular portion of it as being some spe-
cific way, or ways; e.g. blue, loud, sweet, and so on.
There has been much debate over the precise nature and 
structure of the content of experience, and how it compares 
to the content of belief.7 For example, some representation-
alists take perceptual content to be propositional (e.g. 
McDowell 1994; Brewer 1999), e.g. assessable for truth or 
falsity, while others take it to be, at least in part, pre- or 
non-conceptual (e.g. Peacocke 1998, 2001a, b; Kelly 2001; 
Bermudez 2009; Dretske 1969, 1981). However, it is gener-
ally taken to be a constraint upon representational theories 
of perception that such content has veridicality, accuracy or 
correctness conditions.8 Unlike philosophical notions of 
truth and falsity, which are standardly taken to be bivalent, 
6 See also Crane (1998) and Kriegel (2016).
7 For a survey of recent work, see Brogaard (2014b), Hawley and 
Macpherson (2011), and Siegel (2016).
8 For a discussion of the various kinds of veridicality, see  Siegel 
(2010a, b).
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these notions may admit of variations in degree. The mere 
existence of veridicality conditions, however, does not 
entail representationalism as we are defining it. For exam-
ple, it is possible that experiences might possess veridical-
ity conditions that are describable from some third-personal 
point of view, such as that of vision science, with the result-
ing content being entirely  subpersonal. Subpersonal con-
tents are not contents of any conscious experiential state or 
episode, and so do not qualify as contents of experience. A 
successful argument for representationalism must therefore 
show that the relevant accuracy conditions are in some 
sense available to, or accessible by, the subject at a first-
personal level; e.g. in reasoning or action.9
In addition to their promise of offering an integrated 
account of the mind in terms of intentional states or pro-
cesses, representational views are claimed to possess sev-
eral significant advantages. First, they support a straight-
forward account of illusions and hallucinations which, like 
false beliefs, are held to have substantially the same content 
as veridical perceptions, but whose veridicality conditions 
are not met. That is to say, non-veridical experiences mis-
represent. This is sometimes claimed (e.g. by Byrne 2009) 
to offer representational views a prima facie advantage 
in that they unify a diverse range of perceptual phenom-
ena under a single explanans—namely, representational 
content. However, relationalists dispute that the principal 
explananda for a theory of perception include hallucina-
tions and illusions, as opposed to focusing upon the cen-
tral case of veridical perception. This methodological dif-
ference concerning the priority of veridical perception over 
non-veridical experience, as compared to the desire for a 
parsimonious explanation of both kinds of cases, is part of 
what motivates the present debate (Sect. 3).
Prior to the emergence of modern representationalism, 
the possibility of perceptually indistinguishable hallucina-
tions and illusions had often been taken to support indirect 
realism; e.g. sense-datum theory (Moore 1918, 1926; Price 
1932; Broad 1952; Russell 1921) or the representative real-
ism of Locke (2008) or Hume (2007). This may be con-
trasted with direct realist accounts of experience according 
to which we are directly or immediately aware of external 
objects rather than via some perceptual intermediary, such 
as sense-data, ideas or impressions. Representationalism, 
however, claims to offer a simpler and allegedly superior 
explanation of the possibility of perceptually indistinguish-
able illusions and hallucinations, viz: subjectively indistin-
guishable non-veridical experience involves the representa-
tion of type-identical content to the equivalent veridical 
experience despite being caused in a non-standard or 
9 See Travis (2004, 2013a), Siegel (2010a, b), Wilson (forthcoming) 
and Ivanov (this issue).
deviant manner. Thus, subjectively indistinguishable verid-
ical and non-veridical experiences share a representational 
‘common factor’ or content. Representationalists claim that 
this is compatible with direct realism since representational 
contents are not themselves objects of perception, as with 
sense-data, but part of the means by which we perceive 
objects. Whether this genuinely succeeds in securing direct 
realism, however, and whether, given representationalists’ 
other commitments, a unified account of perception and 
hallucination is available to them, are disputed.10
Second, representational views offer an appealing expla-
nation of how experiences justify or rationalise perceptual 
judgements and beliefs. In the simplest case, experiences 
having personal-level contents makes it easy to explain 
how these can be “taken up”, “subscribed to” or “taken 
at face value” (McDowell 1994) in judgement and belief. 
More generally, the contents of perceptual beliefs may be 
held to be systematically related or identical to the contents 
of experience, thereby explaining how perception justifies 
or rationalises those beliefs. A parallel explanation can be 
given in the case of action. That beliefs and intentional 
actions have contents, however, is common ground between 
representational and non-representational views of experi-
ence, which differ only in respect of whether experiences 
have contents and so are themselves belief-like. This places 
an explanatory burden upon the anti-representationalist to 
explain how experiences can justify or rationalise beliefs if 
not via their contents. A comparable explanatory burden, 
however, falls upon the representationalist to explain what 
fixes or individuates contents of experience, and how this 
can justify beliefs even if, according to common factor 
views, it is possible for non-veridical experiences to have 
type-identical contents. Determination of content is there-
fore an issue for both views, though for the anti-relational-
ist this relates to the contents of perceptual judgements or 
beliefs rather than experiences (see Sect. 3).
Related to the common factor view described above, and 
central to the dispute with relationalists, a further claim 
made by many representationalists is that the phenomenal 
character of an experience is determined by its representa-
tional content and/or manner of representation (e.g. blurri-
ness). This view, known as intentionalism, or sometimes 
simply ‘representationalism’,11 admits of both weak and 
10 See Sect. 4, Martin (this issue), and Travis (this issue).
11 Unfortunately, neither term is used consistently throughout the lit-
erature, with some authors failing to distinguish between the two, or 
using ‘representationalism’ and ‘intentionalism’ more or less inter-
changeably. To avoid confusion, we will adopt the terms ‘representa-
tional view(s)’ or ‘representationalism’ for representational theories 
in general, while reserving ‘intentionalism’ for claims that relate spe-
cifically to phenomenal character. Any divergences from this usage 
are noted below. For further discussion of intentionalism, see Byrne 
(2001) and Crane (2009).
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strong variants. According to weak intentionalism, an expe-
rience’s phenomenal character supervenes upon its repre-
sentational content such that there can be no difference in 
phenomenal character without a difference in representa-
tional content.12 According to strong intentionalism, on the 
other hand, phenomenal character is identical to at least 
some elements of an experience’s content; e.g. its concep-
tual or non-conceptual content (cf. Tye 2002, 2007; Schel-
lenberg 2011). As such, strong intentionalism entails weak 
intentionalism, but not vice versa. In both cases, however, it 
remains an important question whether the same, i.e. type-
identical, content can consistently perform both epistemo-
logical and phenomenological roles—a point that some 
relationalists have disputed (Travis 2004, 2013a).
In summary, representational views take many different 
forms, each reflecting the various roles that perceptual rep-
resentation might play: individuating experiences, explain-
ing or justifying the contents of beliefs, grounding the qual-
itative character of experience, and explaining the causal 
mechanisms involved in perceptual processing, to name but 
a few. Consequently, there are a wide variety of views that 
differ both in strength and in the kind of contents that they 
assign to perceptual states or episodes. These range from 
the mere attribution of representational content to percep-
tual states without any commitment to this constituting a 
fundamental characterisation of experience—a view some-
times known as the “weak content view” (Brogaard 2014a: 
2)—to exhaustively characterising experiences and/or their 
phenomenal character in representational terms, as per rep-
resentationalism and intentionalism, respectively. Addition-
ally, each view may be held in conjunction with the attribu-
tion of non-conceptual  and/or non-propositional contents, 
be these particular or general, that are held to play a variety 
of explanatory roles.
Despite frequently, and in our view somewhat mislead-
ingly, being portrayed as a two-horse race, many (though 
not all) of the above views appear prima facie compatible 
with at least some variants of relationalism, yielding the 
possibility of hybrid views. For example, one might agree 
that the phenomenal character of perception constitutively 
involves external objects while holding that experiences 
nevertheless possess, or may be associated with, represen-
tational contents.13 For this reason, positions on opposite 
sides of the debate—e.g. Naïve Realism or relationalism 
(Martin 1997, 2004, 2006; Campbell 2002; Brewer 2011; 
Fish 2009; Soteriou 2013) and phenomenal externalism 
(Tye 1995; Lycan 2001)—can appear to have more in com-
mon than that which separates them, raising questions as to 
12 Mutatis mutandis for views that appeal to manners of representa-
tion.
13 Logue’s “Mild Content View” (2014: 223).
precisely what is at issue in the debate and how it is to be 
adjudicated. Moreover, as we have seen, representational-
ism does not preclude that perception directly relates us to 
perceptual objects. Rather, it purports to uphold a form of 
direct realism according to which we are ‘directly’ or 
‘immediately’ aware of external objects, rather than via 
some perceptual intermediary such as sense-data (see 
Sect. 4). Indeed, representation is itself a kind of relation, 
one term of which is the material object, or its properties, 
that we seem to perceive.14 Furthermore, even those who 
deny that perceptual representation entails the existence of 
a perceptual relation (e.g. Crane 2006) agree that we are 
causally related to perceived objects. If relationalism is to 
be distinct from representationalism, then it needs to 
involve a more specific claim.
3  Relational Views
Relational theories of perception take veridical experience 
to involve a primitive, and hence unanalysable, metaphysi-
cal relation to external objects and their properties. While 
variants of the view differ as to precisely which objects 
or properties, facts or events, are admissible as relata of 
experience, they agree that the relational nature of percep-
tion contributes to, or determines, the phenomenal char-
acter of experience. Thus, while characterising perception 
in relational terms might appear to leave it open whether 
experiences also possess representational contents, in 
practice many relationalists oppose such content on the 
grounds that it fails to adequately characterise the funda-
mental nature of veridical perception (Brewer 2011, this 
issue), or that it is explanatorily redundant (Travis 2004, 
2013a). These stronger forms of relationalism thus oppose 
both intentionalism and representationalism (see Brogaard 
this issue;  Travis this issue), and are the target for recent 
defences of those views (e.g. Byrne 2009; Burge 2010; 
Schellenberg 2011). The dispute between representational-
ists and relationalists therefore is as much concerned with 
what plays a particular explanatory role, i.e. determining 
the phenomenal character of experience, as it is the meta-
physics of experience (Wilson forthcoming).
Relationalists are motivated by a variety of methodo-
logical, phenomenological and epistemological considera-
tions. An illustrative, though non-exhaustive, list includes 
explaining:
14 Travis (2013c: 3), for example, describes representation as a three-
place relation.
201Introduction: Perception Without Representation 
1 3
i. The transparency of experience in a way that is least 
revisionary with respect to how experience strikes us 
introspectively (Martin 2002)
ii. The primacy of external objects and/or veridical per-
ception in an overall theory of perception (Brewer 
2011)
iii. The relationality of perception in a way that avoids 
positing metaphysically problematic entities such as 
sense-data (ibid.)
iv. The possibility of demonstrative knowledge and/or ref-
erence (Campbell 2002)
v. The possibility of thought about the external world 
as compared to the direct presentation of particulars 
(Travis 2007, 2012, 2013b)
vi. Epistemic humility concerning judgments about the 
kind of experience that one is having (Martin 2004, 
2006).15
Precisely what relationalists mean by the ‘fundamental 
nature’ of perception, and how the relationality of experi-
ence determines phenomenal character, however, require 
further explication. In relation to the latter, John Campbell 
writes
On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of 
your experience as you look around the room, is con-
stituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which 
particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, 
such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged 
in relation to one another and to you. (2002: 116)
 Similarly, for M. G. F. Martin:
According to [Naïve Realism], the actual objects of 
perception … partly constitute one’s conscious expe-
rience, and hence determine the phenomenal charac-
ter of one’s experience. (2004: 93).
For such relationalists, the phenomenal character of per-
ception is partly constituted by the objects that one experi-
ences and their perceptible properties. Unfortunately, it is 
not always clear what relationalists mean by this claim. 
One way of understanding it, however, follows from the 
nature of the perceptual relation, which cannot obtain with-
out the presence of its external relatum: the object(s) of 
perception. Consequently, external objects are metaphysi-
cally constitutive of both experience and its  phenomenal 
character.16 This constitution claim renders relationalism 
prima facie incompatible with intentionalism, which offers 
15 This list is by no means exhaustive. For further discussion, see 
Soteriou (2014, 2016).
16 Precisely how we should understand this claim is an important 
issue, though not one we have space to fully engage with here.
a purely representational explanation of phenomenal char-
acter (Sect. 2), while leaving it open whether experiences 
have representational contents that fulfil some other explan-
atory role; e.g. in relation to perceptual knowledge. Fur-
thermore, some externalist forms of representationalism on 
which an experience cannot have the same particular con-
tent in the absence of the object represented (e.g. Burge 
1991; Dretske 1995; Lycan 2001; Schellenberg 2010) 
might be seen as compatible with this form of relationalism 
and the above interpretation of the constitution claim. This 
highlights the similarity between variants of each view, 
illustrating how difficult it is to precisely delineate the disa-
greement between relationalist and representationalist 
positions.
Given the central role that relationalists assign to veridi-
cal perception, however,  two of the most important chal-
lenges for the view concern how to account for perceptual 
illusions and hallucinations, respectively. Concerning the 
former, Brewer claims that
[a]ny errors in her world-view which result are 
products of the subject’s responses to this experi-
ence, however automatic, natural or understandable 
in retrospect these responses may be. Error, strictly 
speaking, given how the world actually is, is never an 
essential feature of experience itself. (2006: 169)
 Instead, the erroneous nature of perceptual illusions is 
explained in terms of “misinterpretation” (ibid.) or “mis-
leading perception” (Travis 2004, 2013a), such as when a 
subject mistakenly judges that some perceived object 
instantiates a property, or properties, that it in fact does not 
possess. Whether these explanations amount to the same 
thing, and whether anti-representationalists need to posit 
some additional stage of perceptual interpretation or 
“seeming” (Brogaard this issue) that falls between percep-
tual experience and judgement, remain open questions. 
Nevertheless, as with the standard representationalist 
explanation of illusions, the metaphysical and explanatory 
structure of such experiences is consistent with that of the 
veridical case—a point that is sometimes overlooked by 
opponents of the view.17
Hallucinations, on the other hand, are more challenging 
for relationalism, since these are precisely cases in which 
the subject is not directly related to any causally relevant 
external object. To explain such cases, relationalists typi-
cally adopt some form of disjunctivism (Soteriou 2014, 
2016). Indeed, if relationalism is characterised as a claim 
about what explains or constitutes the phenomenal 
17 E.g. Byrne (2009). For discussion of forms of relationalism that 
treat illusions as being akin to hallucinations, see Byrne and Logue 
(2008).
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character of experience, then it is already committed to a 
specific form of disjunctivism: namely, that the subjective 
character of veridical perceptions and hallucinations cannot 
be explained in the same way.18 In offering a positive 
account of hallucination whereby, for example, such expe-
riences present uninstantiated universals (Johnston 2004), 
sense-data or intentional objects,19 the relationalist leaves it 
open that the same explanation also applies in the case of 
veridical perception. In the case of causally matching hal-
lucinations that are brought about by the same brain state as 
a veridical perception, this gives rise to what Martin (2004, 
2006) calls the “screening-off” problem, whereby it seems 
that whatever accounts for the phenomenal character of the 
hallucination should also suffice to explain the phenomenal 
character of a mental state brought about by the same brain 
state, thereby rendering redundant the explanatory power 
that relationalists attribute to the object of perception in the 
veridical case. To avoid this, some relationalists, including 
Martin and Brewer, endorse a negative form of disjunctiv-
ism according to which the only positive definition of the 
mental properties of causally matching hallucinations that 
can be given is that they are subjectively indistinguishable, 
or “indiscriminable”, from veridical perception (ibid.). 
Others find the lack of a positive characterisation of hallu-
cination unsatisfying.
It is important to realise that many disjunctivists iden-
tify an experience’s phenomenal character with the obtain-
ing of a relation to the objects and properties that, on their 
view, constitute it. On this understanding of the term, an 
experience’s phenomenal character is individuated more 
finely than what can be distinguished from a first-personal 
perspective. Hence two subjectively indistinguishable expe-
riences can possess different phenomenal characters in vir-
tue of the fact that they involve the perception of distinct 
objects and/or properties. Moreover, since hallucinations 
do not involve direct acquaintance with the object, then 
strictly speaking, they lack perceptual phenomenal charac-
ter in this sense of the term. This does not of course mean 
that such disjunctivists deny there is anything it is like to 
undergo a hallucination. Rather, they claim that the sub-
jective character of hallucination and that of veridical per-
ception do not share the same constitutive nature. In other 
18 A claim that is disputed by Burge (2005, 2011).
19 Price (1932) discusses at length what he calls ‘Selective Theory’ 
which endorses a relational view of perception and a sense-datum 
view of hallucination, where sense data are mind-independent non-
physical objects. Austin (based on remarks in his 1962: 50, 52, 54) 
may be read as suggesting, at least for the sake of argument, a form of 
disjunctivism of this kind (see Byrne and Logue 2008; Soteriou 2016: 
18 for this interpretation of Austin). Langsam (1997) maintains that 
in hallucination we are aware of a portion of space. To our knowl-
edge, no one has yet combined a relational account of perception with 
an intentional account of hallucination.
words, perceptual appearances, or looks, are multiply real-
isable. It is therefore no objection to relational views that 
they fail to unify veridical and non-veridical experiences. 
Rather, despite the possibility of subjective indistinguish-
ability, relationalism involves precisely the claim that hallu-
cinations cannot be, and indeed should not be, explained in 
the same way as veridical perception. Hence relationalists 
take the primary explanandum of a theory of perception 
to be veridical perception, and not perceptual experience 
more generally where this includes both veridical and non-
veridical experiences, since the latter may require a differ-
ent explanation that is dependent upon the former.
4  ‘Direct’ Versus ‘Indirect’ Perception
According to sense-datum theories of perception, the 
immediate or ‘direct’ objects of perception are not every-
day external objects, as in Naïve Realism, but a perceptual 
intermediary, or sense-datum. This yields a form of indirect 
realism which, according to Berkeley (1982), creates an 
unacceptable ‘veil of perception’ between the mind and the 
external world. Similarly, if perceptual representations, 
rather than the objects and properties that they represent, 
constituted direct objects of perceptual experience—a view 
often attributed to Locke—then the resulting theory would 
be perceptually indirect. In a move reminiscent of adverbi-
alism,20 however, modern representationalists aim to avoid 
this objection by arguing that representations are not them-
selves objects of awareness, but part of the means by which 
we perceive such objects. As such, it is the external objects 
that experiences represent as having certain properties 
which should be regarded as direct objects of perception, 
and not their representational contents.21 Indeed, many rep-
resentationalists, and therefore intentionalists, reject the 
idea that experiences strictly speaking possess an act–object 
structure, instead characterising them as merely causally or 
contingently related to the external objects of perception.
4.1  Bill Brewer: The Object View
In his contribution to this issue, Bill Brewer responds to 
various objections addressed to the version of relational-
ism he proposes: the “Object View”. Among these is Bro-
gaard’s (2014b) charge that, with its insistence on the con-
tribution of the subject’s point of view and the conditions 
of perception in determining the phenomenal character of 
20 For an overview, see Crane and French (2016: Sect. 3.2).
21 For further discussion of the distinction between direct and indi-
rect realism, see Snowdon (1992), and Crane and French (2016).
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experience, the Object View can be assimilated to a posi-
tion “on which our perceptual relation with indirect exter-
nal objects of perception is somehow the result of computa-
tions on more basic direct objects such as retinal images” 
(this issue). Brewer responds that “there is no obvious 
reason to believe that every theory that gives the perceiv-
er’s point of view a role in accounting for the way things 
look is committed to regarding such retinal images as the 
direct objects of perception in any sense” (ibid.). Thus, for 
Brewer, while computations on retinal images are “essen-
tial psychological enabling conditions” of our perceptual 
relation to external objects, they are not themselves objects 
of perceptual awareness. (See Sect.  5 for discussion of 
Brewer’s view of perceptual appearances, or looks.)
4.2  Charles Travis
In ‘Deliverances (Indirection)’, Charles Travis addresses 
the question of whether representationalists are entitled 
to claim that perception furnishes us with a direct aware-
ness of, or access to, environmental particulars, or whether 
representational content is itself problematically opaque. 
Framed as a continuation of his long-running debate with 
John McDowell (2008, 2013, ms), who endorses a disjunc-
tive form of representationalism, Travis’s paper can also be 
read as offering a general critique of representationalists’ 
appropriation of the language of direct realism despite pos-
iting the existence of a theoretical intermediary—namely, 
representational content.
Travis begins by differentiating two kinds of ‘veiling’ 
that representational content might generate concerning 
the notions of resemblance and instancing, respectively. 
The former is a problem for Locke, who held that percep-
tual representations ‘resemble’ what they represent. How-
ever, since these representations, which are presumably 
grounded in physical properties of the brain, do not instan-
tiate the perceptible properties that they attribute — round-
ness, blueness, loudness, and so on — “[w]e are left with 
no grasp of what resemblance in [Locke’s] sense might be” 
(Travis, this issue). Indeed, for Travis, Locke’s resemblance 
relation is simply ungraspable and, as such, cannot confer 
knowledge of how things in the world are.
The problem of instancing, on the other hand, is targeted 
at McDowell. If perceptual experiences represent how 
things in the world are, then in order to be of any epistemic 
use, it must be possible for us to grasp or recognise “what 
ways an experience represents things as being” (this issue; 
cf. Travis 2004, 2013a). According to Travis, experience 
must facilitate a passage from awareness of environmental 
particulars, i.e. external or what Travis calls “historical” 
objects and their properties, to awareness that something is 
the case, which is factive or “conceptual”.22 However, and 
herein lies the alleged problem, perceptual representation 
involves an awareness of generalities and not only particu-
lars, and so already lies on the far side of this passage. 
Thus, Travis argues, either (a) representation cannot facili-
tate such a passage, and so is redundant, or else (b) it does 
so mysteriously, since nothing in the relevant representa-
tions can tell us what would count as instances of their con-
tents. Hence, by analogy with Locke, the external world is 
“veiled” from us by the opacity of the instancing relation, 
which is neither given by, nor deducible from, perceptual 
experience on McDowell’s representational view.
Travis holds that experience merely presents external 
objects and their particular properties to the perceiver, 
without them being presented, or represented, as being any 
particular way. He argues that if content is to be epistemi-
cally useful, perception must at some point bottom out in 
such an awareness of environmental particulars prior to the 
tokening of content. For Travis, content does not enter the 
picture until the subject exercises their capacity for judge-
ment or belief-formation. Travis and McDowell thus disa-
gree over whether these content-tokening capacities are 
operative at the level of experience (McDowell’s view) or 
are post-perceptual (Travis’s view), with consequences for 
whether the resulting content is attributable to perceptual 
experiences or judgements, respectively. Here, Travis iden-
tifies a problem that is common to him and his opponents: 
explaining how the contents of perceptual judgements, if 
not of experiences proper, arise. The demarcation of per-
ceptual and cognitive states, along with the nature and 
functioning of our recognitional and conceptual capacities, 
are thus central to this debate, the Fregean underpinnings 
of which are helpfully summarised in the final sections of 
Travis’s paper.
4.3  M. G. F. Martin
While Travis and Brewer discuss where intentionalism and 
Naïve Realism sit with respect to the traditional debate 
about direct versus indirect realism, M. G. F. Martin sees 
the intentional approach as addressing the same concerns 
that were central to that debate, i.e. how objects deter-
mine the phenomenal character of experience. However, 
according to Martin, intentionalism does so in a way that 
widens the debate and renders the old dispute about the 
‘direct object’ of perception outdated. With the introduc-
tion of the intentional framework, “the question now is 
22 Travis’s notion of the “conceptual” includes representations of 
particular objects and events that involve concepts which are satisfi-
able by just one historical individual.
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not only which objects can feature in our experience, but 
how they can so feature” (this issue). Although the terms 
of the traditional debate are narrower than they need to 
be and “it might be proper to retire talk of direct percep-
tion and direct realism”, Martin argues, contrary to Austin 
(1962), that the traditional debate over direct realism is not 
empty or ill-defined, nor it is obvious or trivial in the way 
that Chisholm (1957) and others have contended. Instead, 
Martin proposes an illuminating reading of the significance 
of this debate, focusing on ‘Seeing Surfaces and Physical 
Objects’ in which Thompson Clarke (1965) takes issue 
with G. E. Moore’s claim that we only see the surfaces of 
objects. Although Clarke ultimately rejects Moore’s claim, 
he maintains that the question is serious and not trivial. If it 
turned out that, when seeing a tomato, we can only directly 
see its facing surfaces, we would hardly be better off than 
in a case where a portion of the tomato were sliced off 
and occluded the rest of it. We would not be related to the 
tomato in virtue of being related to the surface; we would 
be cut off from it.
The opposition between direct and indirect objects of 
perception is substantial only if we find a connotation of 
‘object’ that “appl[ies] to some, but not all, ways of exem-
plifying it”. Unfortunately, neither Moore nor Clarke are 
explicit about how this opposition should be understood, 
and more explicit distinctions, such as Jackson’s (1977) 
“mediate” and “immediate” objects of vision, are uninform-
ative. The relevant connotation may be clarified, however, 
with the help of an analogy with immediate versus medi-
ate location. “Objects compete with each other for being 
immediately located in a region”, even if one is located in 
one region in virtue of being located in another. Similarly, 
the surface of the tomato seems to compete with the entire 
tomato in “fixing the overall look of the scene” and thus, 
according to Moore, in counting as the direct object of per-
ception. In this competition, there are good reasons to think 
that the surface pre-empts the entire object, as the surface 
seems sufficient to fix the same look. This argument mirrors 
Martin’s own “screening off” argument (2004, 2006)  that 
motivates his  negative disjunctivism (Sect.  3). However, 
there is a solution available here that was not available with 
respect to the “screening off” problem: one can deny that 
seeing a surface pre-empts seeing the object. Although 
seeing a surface removed from its object and seeing the 
whole object might be subjectively indistinguishable from 
the point of view of the subject, they are indeed different 
situations, with different objects playing analogous roles in 
determining the phenomenal character of the experience.
Clarke, on the other hand, concedes that seeing the sur-
face of the tomato pre-empts seeing the whole tomato in 
determining the phenomenal character of the experience. 
Thus the only strategy that remains available to him to 
defend the claim that we do, under normal circumstances, 
directly see the whole tomato is to commit to the indeter-
minacy of facts about experience. He maintains that the 
claim that we directly see only the surfaces becomes true 
only in special circumstances where we restrict the applica-
tion of the verb ‘see’. This shows how difficult it is to resist 
Moore’s conclusion once we accept that “there is nothing 
more to what we know of our sense experience other than 
what we can report in terms of what we see”. If one wants 
to avoid Clarke’s commitment to the indeterminacy of per-
ceptual facts, one ought to provide an account that accom-
modates our initial intuition that, when we see the tomato, 
we do not see only its surface.
 Unlike sense-datum theories, intentional views are con-
servative with respect to the question of what objects we 
are aware of when we perceive. They make space for this by 
being revisionary with respect to the way in which objects are 
presented in perception. It is not clear that this is in accord 
with our initial intuitions about our experience of objects. 
Thus, whether intentionalists can rightly claim that their 
account preserves direct realism will depend on whether the 
introduction of representational content “leaves unchallenged 
what we all can initially claim about our experience”.
5  Appearances and the Phenomenology 
of Experience
As we have characterised them, relationalism and inten-
tionalism purportedly offer competing accounts of the phe-
nomenal character of experience (Sects. 2 and 3). Much of 
the debate between them therefore turns on the adequacy 
of these accounts. Here we focus on four such issues con-
cerning the duality of perceptual appearances (Brogaard), 
the relational account of perceptual appearances and illu-
sions (Brewer), the relevance of conscious experience for 
the possibility of thought (Eilan), and the sense of presence 
(Dokic & Martin), respectively.
5.1  Berit Brogaard
In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Charles Travis (2004, 
2013a) argues that perceptual experiences cannot have rep-
resentational contents because they are, in an important 
sense, equivocal or indeterminate between multiple ways 
that the world might be. Thus, in what one of us has else-
where called Travis’s “argument from looks” (Wilson forth-
coming), “in perception, things are not presented, or repre-
sented, to us as being thus and so. They are just presented 
to us, full stop” (Travis 2004: 65).23 Travis’s argument for 
23 Notably, Travis does not rule out the existence of sub-personal 
representations—as part of a neuroscientific explanation of percep-
tual processing, for example
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this point draws on the various kinds of looks—compara-
tive, epistemic, phenomenal—that might conceivably make 
such representations available to the subject, and concludes 
that none is able to do so. Thus, even if there were such a 
thing as perceptual representation, it would be cognitively 
inaccessible to the subject and so explanatorily 
redundant.24
Berit Brogaard (this issue) offers a new line of response 
to Travis.25 While Brogaard agrees with Travis that repre-
sentation is not an essential feature of perceptual experi-
ence, she argues that empirical evidence concerning the 
duality of appearances favours the view that, for perceivers 
like us, visual experiences do represent the world as being 
some particular way, and so are not equivocal in the man-
ner that Travis suggests.
Brogaard takes Travis’s argument to concern the inde-
pendence of perceptual content from the agent’s epistemic 
states: beliefs, judgements, and so on. This is what we 
would expect if, as per representationalist orthodoxy, the 
contents of some such states—for example, the belief that 
some particular tomato is red—derive from the contents of 
experience, e.g. seeing the red tomato, rather than the other 
way around.26 If, in addition to this, the contents of experi-
ences were themselves dependent upon the contents of 
beliefs, then the relationship between the two would be cir-
cular, and so not explanatory. Brogaard argues, however, 
that Travis’s denial that experiences have any recognisable 
content, or “face value”, fails to do justice to visual phe-
nomenology. According to Brogaard, visual experiences 
can and do favour one interpretation over others, and so 
things can look to be a particular way independently of the 
subject’s epistemic states. Consequently, Brogaard argues, 
a key premise of Travis’s argument is false, and intentional-
ism is again off the hook.
Brogaard concludes by offering a positive “Argument 
from Phenomenology” in favour of representational con-
tent. Like Susanna Schellenberg’s “Master Argument” 
(2011), Brogaard argues that we cannot fully explain vis-
ual phenomenal character without appealing to the notion 
of “perceptual seeming”. According to Brogaard, such 
“seemings” favour intentionalism over non-representational 
alternatives. Of course, anti-representationalists might in 
turn dispute whether “seemings” are wholly perceptual as 
opposed to being complex, partly epistemic states, as with 
24 For alternative formulations of, and responses to, Travis’s argu-
ment, see Brogaard (this issue) and Raleigh (2013).
25 Brogaard uses “Representational View” to mean what we have 
called ‘intentionalism’ (Sect. 2).
26 One might resist this claim on the basis of the cognitive penetra-
tion of experience by belief (Stokes 2013) or there being no sharp 
distinction between perception and cognition, as in predictive pro-
cessing models (Clark 2016).
Brewer’s ‘thick’ notion of looks (Sect. 5.2). Nevertheless, 
since the phenomena Brogaard describe involve appear-
ances that are robustly independent of the subject’s beliefs, 
in order to avoid her conclusion the anti-representationalist 
must either (a) posit the existence of some further non-dox-
astic state that falls between ‘pure’ experience and belief, 
or else (b) provide an analysis of such phenomena in terms 
of existing epistemic states. Brogaard’s Argument from 
Phenomenology can therefore be seen as challenging the 
adequacy of relationalism in accommodating the human 
visual system’s adherence to certain perceptual principles.
5.2  Bill Brewer: Thin and Thick Looks
According to Brewer’s ‘Object View’  (Sect.  4.1), an 
object’s visually appearing or “thinly” looking F is 
explained by its possessing “appropriate visually relevant 
similarities with paradigm exemplars of F” (this issue), i.e. 
objects that are paradigmatically F.27 Thus, the lines of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, for example, look to be of different 
lengths not because we represent them to be such, but 
because the presence of the arrowheads causes them to vis-
ually resemble paradigm cases of three-dimensional convex 
and concave edges that are closer to or further away from 
the subject, respectively (Brewer 2008). Due to the phe-
nomenon of size constancy, our visual system automati-
cally adjusts for such depth cues, causing the lines to 
appear as being unequal in length, as would in fact be the 
case  in the equivalent three-dimensional figure. Despite 
their dependence upon contingent properties of our visual 
systems, such similarities are nevertheless mind-independ-
ent in that they are grounded in objective features of exter-
nal objects independently of the subject’s thinking or repre-
senting anything to be so. Indeed, Brewer argues that such 
illusions are more problematic for orthodox representa-
tional views, which are committed to there being some fact 
of the matter as to precisely how long subjects represent the 
lines as being (ibid.).
Thin looks alone, however, are insufficient to explain 
the phenomenology of figures like the Necker cube or 
duck-rabbit which appear to flip between different possible 
appearances. Nor do they explain why we tend to register 
some of an object’s similarities over others. A white piece 
of chalk illuminated by red light, for example, possesses 
visually relevant similarities to both (a) red objects under 
normal illumination conditions, and (b) white objects illu-
minated by red light. Yet, even given that looking white-in-
red-light is a way of looking white, we would not ordinarily 
27 Though Brewer focuses exclusively on vision, his account is pre-
sumably intended to generalise to other sensory modalities.
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say that white chalk in red light “looks white”, except pos-
sibly in Chisholm’s (1957) epistemic use of ‘looks’. To 
overcome these objections, Brewer appeals to a “thick” 
notion of looks which involves the “perceptual registra-
tion” of a particular visual similarity or appearance. Thus, 
in respect of its colour, the chalk thinly looks both red and 
white-in-red-light, but thickly only looks red, since this is 
the property that our visual systems typically register under 
normal circumstances. Brewer takes the central cases of 
perceptual registration to involve the application of a con-
cept, but allows that there may be forms of registration, and 
so thick looks, that are non-conceptual. Interestingly, both 
of these cases can also be described in terms of the token-
ing of representational elements. Thus, Brewer’s theory 
accords with Brogaard in allowing a role for representa-
tional content in determining the phenomenal character of 
experience in the thick sense. Brewer argues, however, that 
this does not undermine the Object View’s claim to be a 
form of relationalism, since (a) it fundamentally character-
ises experience in terms of the subject’s relation to exter-
nal mind-independent objects, and so as non-reducible to 
its representational content, and (b) the representational 
elements in thick looks are themselves dependent upon the 
obtaining of this perceptual relation.
5.3  Naomi Eilan
In Reference and Consciousness, John Campbell (2002) 
argues that only a relational view of perception can ade-
quately make sense of how conscious experience plays a 
crucial role in enabling demonstrative thoughts about the 
categorical properties and mind-independent objects that 
we perceive. According to relationalism, one is confronted 
with the very mind-independent objects that demonstrative 
judgments refer to, thereby explaining how perception can 
provide knowledge of the semantic values of such demon-
stratives. Conversely, Campbell argues that representational 
views fall short of accounting for the explanatory role of 
experience because by postulating conceptual content they 
presuppose what is to be explained: the possession and 
ability to use demonstrative concepts.28 To counter this 
argument, a representationalist could either (a) deny that 
experience plays the explanatory role that Campbell assigns 
to it (Burge 2005; Cassam 2011), or (b) argue that repre-
sentationalism succeeds in explaining the role of experi-
ence in allowing us to have a conception of objects in the 
world as mind-independent, and of properties as categori-
cal. Indeed, many representationalists, and in particular 
28 Campbell here assumes that the representationalist is committed 
to conceptual content, though his arguments for this claim remain 
largely implicit.
proponents of phenomenal externalism (cf. Tye 1995; 
Lycan 2001), would argue that the phenomenal character of 
experience plays precisely such a role in explaining the 
objective import of experience through its representational 
content.
Naomi Eilan (this issue) challenges both of the above 
strategies. She begins by formulating a challenge to rep-
resentationalism on Burge’s behalf, which she labels 
“Burge*’s Challenge”. It takes the form of the following 
dilemma: either (i) endorse the general structure of Burge’s 
representational account of perception, which she labels 
“Caused Representation”, and give up on a role for con-
sciousness, or (ii) relinquish Caused Representation, and 
defend a role for consciousness. As noted above, Burge 
himself opts for the first horn. On this account, everything 
there is to say about how perceptions achieve objective 
import also applies to blindsight (Weiskrantz 1986), which 
is often described as a case in which the subject lacks con-
scious experience despite enjoying a perception that accu-
rately represents the properties of the external object.
The alternatives are to opt for the second horn, or to 
reject the dilemma. Many defenders of representational-
ism about perceptual experience would argue for the latter 
option: to give consciousness a role within a representa-
tionalist framework. To test this, Eilan formulates a scepti-
cal challenge for claims to the effect that perceptions have 
objective import, which is to explain what makes it the case 
that we perceive particular categorical properties rather 
than their structural equivalents. She argues that it can be 
met only by relational adoptions of the second horn of the 
dilemma, and in particular by those versions that appeal 
to Russellian acquaintance with mind-independent objects 
and their properties, where such acquaintance is conceived 
of as “knowledge of things” independently of “knowledge 
of truths”.
The paper ends with a comparison between Eilan’s posi-
tion and that adopted by phenomenal intentionalists (Hor-
gan et  al. 2004; Kriegel and Horgan 2008), who would 
reject the dilemma by endorsing Burge’s approach to the 
representational content of perception while at the same 
time insisting that consciousness is integral to perceptual 
forms of representation. Eilan argues that such accounts 
cannot meet the sceptical challenge in a way that, contra 
Burge and according to our intuitions, gives consciousness 
a role in delivering objective import.
5.4  Jérôme Dokic and Jean‑Rémy Martin
Another crucial aspect of the phenomenology of experience 
is the sense of reality, also known as a sense or feeling of 
presence. Against philosophers who see this sense of pres-
ence as constitutive of genuine perception, Jérôme Dokic 
and Jean-Rémy Martin argue that it is two-way independent 
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from the contents of perception, and that this has an impor-
tant implication for the debate over intentionalism and rela-
tionalism which results in intentionalism being unable to 
account for the sense of reality.
Dokic and Martin distinguish between two different 
phenomena that are commonly  referred to by the expres-
sion “sense of presence”: (i) the sense that an object is real, 
or “sense of reality”, which is the central concern of their 
paper; and (ii) the sense that we are acquainted with the 
object itself rather than some surrogate or representation, 
which they call “sense of acquaintance”. To distinguish 
these, the authors consider studies on derealisation, a dis-
order in which, they argue, patients are best described as 
lacking the sense that what they experience is real while 
preserving otherwise normal perceptual capacities. This 
suggests that the sense of reality is not constitutive of per-
ception. Rather, it is a specific experience that is “enjoyed 
over and above the perceptual experience itself”, and which 
might fail independently of other perceptual capacities.
While the case of derealisation shows that experience 
can occur without a sense of reality, three other cases show 
that derealisation may occur without a genuine experi-
ence: (i) an experience, common in cases of Parkinson’s 
disease, in which patients report that they vividly perceive 
the presence of a person without seeing, touching, hear-
ing, or smelling that person, who is not in fact there; (ii) 
recent studies on virtual reality suggest that increasing the 
realism of spatiotemporal content doesn’t correlate with an 
increased sense of reality, nor vice versa; (iii) certain forms 
of hallucination where quite unrealistic entities are experi-
enced as part of the world, presenting a similar dissociation 
of sense of reality from level of realism of the content of 
experience. Such cases suggest that the sense that an object 
is present does not require that the object is perceived.
Further to these empirical considerations, Dokic and 
Martin provide theoretical consideration for the claim that 
the sense of reality is not constitutive of perceptual experi-
ence. They suggest that the best explanation for this phe-
nomenon is that it is an affective component, akin to a 
metacognitive feeling, “based on various reality-monitor-
ing processes, and processes that control one’s spontane-
ous judgment of reality” (this issue). With this understand-
ing of the sense of reality in place, the authors formulate 
the following challenge for intentionalism. Since genuine 
perception is possible without the sense of reality, how 
should perceptual experience be characterised in contrast to 
other kinds of sensory mental states, such as imaginings, 
which are clearly representational? The natural way for the 
intentionalist to do this would be to claim that, contrary 
to these other states, the content of perception asserts that 
the representation is veridical. But this conflicts with the 
above empirical and theoretical considerations that speak 
in favour of their independence. The alternative would be 
to deny that perception is fundamentally different from 
phenomena such as imagination, where the only distinc-
tion between the two is that the former, but not the latter, is 
accompanied by the distinctive sense of presence. Accord-
ing to Dokic and Martin, relationalism, on the other hand, 
“seems to be able to explain the specificity of perception 
independently of the instantiation of the sense of reality. 
Unlike imagination, perception is a relation to the world, 
and the veridicality of perceptual experience does not rest 
on the truth or correctness of a representation” (ibid.).
6  Assessing Arguments for  
Representational Content
6.1  Michael O’Sullivan
In addition to the kind of general philosophical considera-
tions that Travis, Brogaard and others identify, a variety of 
empirical phenomena have been argued to count in favour 
of perceptual representation. Here, Michael O’Sullivan 
examines one such case from the psychological literature 
concerning the perception of numerosity.
In visual perception, arrays of objects that are too 
numerous to subitize, i.e. immediately recognise or ‘see’ 
their quantity, appear perceptually distinct from arrays con-
taining different numbers of objects. That is, they exhibit a 
distinctive “numerosity look” or appearance. An intention-
alist explanation of these appearances would be that numer-
osity looks obtain in virtue of some property, or properties, 
that these experiences represent. According to Burr and 
Ross (2008, 2012), for example, we are directly sensitive 
to the actual numerosity of visual arrays, with this prop-
erty featuring in the representational content of experience. 
Another view, defended by Durgin (1995, 2008), holds 
that we are sensitive to, and so represent, only the size and 
density of such arrays, and are merely indirectly sensitive 
to numerosity which is not itself represented in experi-
ence. Since these two views ascribe different representa-
tional contents to visual experience, the question arises as 
to which, if either, of them identifies the properties that 
underpin numerosity looks.
O’Sullivan argues that this apparent representational dif-
ference cannot be settled empirically because there is no 
fact of the matter as to which property is being represented. 
Indeed, we might equally well posit representation of a dis-
junctive property whose disjuncts include both numerosity 
and density in order to explain the phenomenal character of 
such visual arrays. Against the rejoinder that precisely this 
disjunctive property is represented in visual experience, 
O’Sullivan argues that at this point “the specifically repre-
sentational features of the posited token mental state are no 
longer doing any work” (this issue). Thus, we might equally 
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claim that the subject directly registers the numerosity look 
of the array in a way that does not involve the tokening of 
representational content, as per enactivist or relationalist 
explanations of numerosity phenomena, since it is indeter-
minate what, if any, content is represented. This apparent 
indeterminacy surrounding the attribution of visual con-
tent raises doubts as to the adequacy of the representational 
view’s characterisation of the content of experience.
O’Sullivan’s argument highlights the difficulty in offer-
ing representationalist explanations of perceptual phe-
nomena to support the position in cases where alternative 
non-representational explanations are also available. A 
representationalist might respond to this by questioning 
whether O’Sullivan’s account generalises to cover more 
‘primitive’ properties of visual experience, such as shape 
or colour, or to other sensory modalities. Alternatively, 
they might argue that the alleged indeterminacy reflects an 
epistemological difficulty in determining what the relevant 
representational content is, rather than raising a deeper 
metaphysical question concerning its existence. Finally, 
they might simply agree that perceptual content need not 
straightforwardly map onto our pre-theoretical intuitions 
about individual cases, while retaining the idea that expe-
riences are nevertheless representational. Each of these 
possibilities raises interesting methodological questions 
concerning precisely how perceptual content is to be indi-
viduated, and its explanatory role in grounding or justifying 
belief.
6.2  J. A. Judge
As a rule to which this collection is no exception, phi-
losophers of perception have tended to focus upon visual 
perception in the (possibly misguided) hope that theories 
of vision will generalise to cover all of the other sensory 
modalities which one might take humans to have. Moreo-
ver, whilst the existence and individuation of perceptual 
content have been widely discussed, the processes that gen-
erate and operate upon such contents have received much 
less attention. In a welcome departure from both of these 
unfortunate  tendencies, J. A. Judge examines whether the 
auditory phenomenon known as the ‘missing fundamental’, 
first highlighted by Helmholtz (1954) and in which sub-
jects are able to ‘hear’ the pitch of a musical note without 
its fundamental frequency actually being present, neces-
sitates the existence of sub-personal perceptual inference. 
This might be argued to constitute evidence in favour of a 
representational view of auditory perception, since in order 
to perform such an inference the auditory system must 
presumably be capable of representing both the incoming 
stimuli and its inferred cause.
Inferentialist explanations are typically used to address 
the problem of the underdetermination of external 
stimuli (e.g. types of object) by proximal stimuli (e.g. reti-
nal images). However, Judge argues that not only does the 
phenomenon of the ‘missing fundamental’ fail to constitute 
a clear candidate for the ascription of an inferential capac-
ity, but that the notion of sub-personal inference is itself 
contentious and in need of further analysis. Following Bog-
hossian (2008, 2014), Judge models sub-personal inference 
on rational inference, or rule-following. According to Bog-
hossian, such cases involve both causal and representational 
constraints, since in order to count as following a particular 
rule, the rule itself must (i) be represented by the subject, 
and (ii) form part of a causal explanation of why they carry 
out the relevant inference. As Wittgenstein observed, how-
ever, merely acting in accordance with a given rule does 
not establish which rule, if any, is being followed. Thus, 
Judge argues, in order for the notion of sub-personal infer-
ence to have explanatory value in the theory of audition, 
the auditory system must make use of “internally stored 
knowledge” (Rock 1997: xiii), or representations of the 
rule to be followed. However, since the ‘missing fundamen-
tal’ is arguably neither a perceptual illusion nor a crucially 
impoverished stimulus, it does not appear to mandate this 
kind of explanation. Rather, as Judge puts it, “the system 
merely looks as though it is following a rule” (this issue).
Here, one might argue that the kind of inferences that 
are involved in auditory processing do not require the sort 
of explicit representation of rules that is present in the case 
of rational inference. If so, however, the burden of proof 
surely lies with the defenders of inferentialism to elucidate 
precisely what notion of inference is involved. Moreover, if 
such mechanisms are sub-personal, then it is not clear how 
they can constitute evidence that experiences are represen-
tational, since the relevant representations do not occur at 
the conscious level. Without some further theory connect-
ing sub-personal representation to the content and/or phe-
nomenal character of experience, the notion of sub-per-
sonal inference remains the preserve of neuroscientific and 
psychological explanations of perceptual processing rather 
than experience per se.
6.3  Ivan V. Ivanov
In Chap. 2 of The Contents of Visual Experience, Susanna 
Siegel (2010a, b) presents an argument for the view that all 
visual experiences have contents — a claim she calls “the 
Content View” (CV). Siegel seeks to establish that the mere 
presentation of properties in visual experience entails that 
these experiences have accuracy conditions that are con-
veyed to the subject. Since Siegel defines the notion of con-
tent precisely in terms of such accuracy conditions, this in 
turn establishes CV. Siegel’s “Argument from Appearing” 
is intended to be neutral on the underlying metaphysics of 
experience, and so apply equally to both representational 
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and relational views of experience. Thus, Siegel aims to 
establish the existence of a weak content view on the basis 
of an alleged phenomenological datum about visual experi-
ence: namely, that it involves the presentation of properties 
“as being instantiated” (Siegel 2010a: 45).
Ivan V. Ivanov (this issue) agrees with Siegel that it is 
plausible that visual experience consists in property-aware-
ness rather than pure object-awareness, but takes issue with 
the alleged metaphysical neutrality of Siegel’s characterisa-
tion of properties. According to Ivanov, on both universalist 
and nominalist views of the metaphysics of property-types, 
a version of Siegel’s argument goes through. However, on 
the equivalent trope-theoretic formulation of relational-
ism, visual experience does not consist in the presentation 
of property-types, but abstract particulars, or tropes, where 
the presentation of a given particular does not convey to 
the subject the type of which it is an instance. Thus, rather 
than being aware of a universal, or fact, perceivers of an 
object that presents some property F are instead aware of 
the object’s F-ness or, equivalently, the object’s being F. 
By adopting tropism, Ivanov argues that the relationalist 
can consistently endorse the seemingly plausible idea that 
experiences ‘present properties’ while rejecting Siegel’s 
representationalist conclusion.
Ivanov’s analysis highlights two important distinctions 
that arise from Siegel’s argument. First, the distinction 
between the presentation of property-types, or universals, 
and the presentation of property-instances, e.g. tropes 
(Ivanov considers non-tropist versions of the latter view in 
the final section of his paper). If Siegel’s argument depends 
upon the first notion of presentation, then it begs the ques-
tion against relationalists like Travis (2004, 2013a) who 
think that visual experience involves only the presentation 
of particulars, and not general types. The presentation of 
property-instances, on the other hand, is more in keeping 
with relationalists’ characterisation of experience. How-
ever, Ivanov argues, on a trope-theoretic understanding of 
property-instances, this need not yield accuracy conditions 
for experience that are conveyed to the subject in the way 
that Siegel’s argument requires.
The second distinction concerns the difference between 
what we might call the mere presentation of objects or 
properties, i.e. what is actually presented to the subject, and 
these being presented as of being some particular way—
an intentional notion. While relationalists agree that expe-
riences are presentational in the first sense, they typically 
deny this entails that they are presentational in the second 
sense, except insofar as the phenomenal character of those 
experiences is partly constituted by the particular objects 
or properties that are in fact presented. Ivanov argues that 
even Siegel’s minimal characterisation of the latter notion 
of presentation fails to remain neutral on the metaphys-
ics of experience, thereby begging the question in favour 
of CV and undermining the force of the Argument from 
Appearing. Whether relationalists can consistently endorse 
the extensional notion of property presentation while also 
denying that objects are presented as of instantiating some 
relevant property-type, however, remains a central question 
in the debate.
7  Future Directions
As we hope this collection demonstrates, whether percep-
tual experience is representational or otherwise goes well 
beyond the question of consistency with perceptual science 
or adherence to ‘common-sense’ assumptions about per-
ception. Indeed, what is at issue in many of these debates 
is not so much the existence of perceptual representation, 
but its explanatory role, or roles, within a philosophically 
adequate theory of perception. As such, hard-line anti-
representationalists like Travis (2004, 2013a) dispute that 
any such content could satisfy what they take to be the 
conflicting demands of explaining the variability of percep-
tual appearances and grounding rational judgements about 
external mind-independent objects. Even so, more moder-
ate relationalists like Brewer, however, who deny that such 
contents features in the most fundamental characterisation 
of perceptual experience, still find a role for representation 
in explaining aspects of perceptual phenomenology such as 
conceptual registration or aspect-switching—a conclusion 
that is echoed by Brogaard (this issue). Furthermore, while 
genuine attempts to reconcile the divide between represen-
tational and relational views exist (e.g. Schellenberg 2011, 
2016; Logue 2014), given the wide variety of explanatory 
demands that representationalists place upon perceptual 
content, the precise shape that such hybrid theories should 
take remains an open and interesting question.
Conversely, given the strongly externalist nature of 
many contemporary theories of perceptual content, one 
might be forgiven for thinking that representationalists have 
already incorporated many of the insights of relationalism, 
such as the particularity of perception, or its dependence 
upon environmental factors, into their view. However, if 
we take representationalism to offer a theory of the con-
tent of conscious perceptual experiences, and not merely 
the sub-personal mechanisms involved in perceptual pro-
cessing, the choice appears less clear cut. To establish this 
stronger role for representation it is necessary not only to 
show that experiences possess contents, or have accuracy 
conditions, but that these contents are in some way mani-
fest, or cognitively available, to the perceiving subject at a 
first-personal level. This in turn highlights the distinction 
between the ‘mere’ presentation of external objects and 
their properties in perception, and those objects being pre-
sented, or represented, as of being some particular way, e.g. 
210 R. Locatelli, K. A. Wilson 
1 3
as instantiating some general type, where only the latter 
entails the existence of propositional or intentional content. 
While alternative non-propositional notions of content are 
available (Crane 1992, 2009), it falls to their proponents to 
explain why we should invoke the notion of representation 
in the explanation of perceptual experience, as opposed to 
an analogous non-representational form of explanation, 
assuming that one is available.
A further question that is raised by several of the follow-
ing essays concerns the relation between the philosophy of 
mind and perception on the one hand, and broader meta-
physical issues, such as the nature of relations or proper-
ties, on the other. While the nature of perceptual experience 
is itself a metaphysical issue, the extent to which this dis-
pute turns on further metaphysical and ontological com-
mitments outside the philosophy of mind has perhaps been 
underestimated. Just as varying the referents of perceptual 
representations or the relata of the perceptual relation has 
the potential to yield quite different theories of perception, 
whether reality consists of objects, universals or tropes 
may have significant implications for theories of percep-
tual awareness. Clarifying the metaphysical commitments 
of both relational and representational views of experience, 
including the precise explanatory role (or roles) of percep-
tual representation, the nature of the perceptual relation, 
and the sense in which external particulars may be said 
to ‘constitute’ an experience’s phenomenal character, thus 
remain central and  important tasks for contemporary phi-
losophy of perception.
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